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This paper examines the determinants of remittance 
behavior for Vietnam using data from the 2004 Vietnam 
Migration Survey on internal migrants. It considers how, 
among other things, the vulnerability of a migrant’s life 
at the destination, their link to relatives back home, and 
the time spent at the destination affect remittances. The 
paper finds that migrants act as risk-averse economic 
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analyze the impact of migration on poverty and economic development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at yniimi@worldbank.org. 
agents and send remittances back to the household of 
origin as part of an insurance exercise in the face of 
economic uncertainty. Remittances are also found to be 
driven by a migrant’s labor market earnings level. The 
paper highlights the important role of remittances in 
providing an effective means of risk-coping and mutual 
support within the family. 
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Migration flows in Vietnam in the past were strictly controlled by a combination of 
government migration policies and the household registration system (ho khau). In order to 
redress imbalances in population density across the country, urban to rural and intra-rural 
migration were explicitly encouraged (Dang et al., 2003). Until the early 1990s, officially 
organized migration was the most common form of internal movement observed in 
Vietnam (Guest, 1998; Dang et al., 2003). Since the middle of the 1990s, however, 
organized migration has been replaced increasingly by a more spontaneous migration 
phenomenon (Hardy, 2000). 
 
The doi moi (renovation) program has been the main driving force behind the apparent shift 
from organized to spontaneous migration in Vietnam. Dang et al. (2003), for example, 
argue that the doi moi policy affected internal migration in three distinct ways: (1) de-
collectivization in the agricultural sector rendered farmers less tied to the land (see Fforde 
and Huan, 2001); (2) the marketization of the economy allowed people, particularly those 
in the urban sector, to be considerably less dependent on government subsidies and 
rationing for their daily necessities; and (3) the increased flow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into Vietnam attracted migrant workers to certain regions, that were the main 
recipients of these investment flows (e.g., the Southeast region). This in turn created 
regional disparities in labor market earnings that provided incentives for internal migrants. 
Pham and Reilly (2007), for example, report that the average hourly wage rate in the 
Southeast region is about 50% higher than the national average.  
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More generally, the observed increase in internal migration in recent years may also be 
attributable in part to the emergence of a young and growing population in Vietnam that 
enjoys greater freedom and a larger array of economic opportunities than earlier 
generations. As of 2004, over one-fifth of the population was aged less than 15 years, and 
the four to 19 age-group grew by over 10% between 1989 and 1999. This yielded annually 
about 1.5 million new entrants for the labor force over this period. During the 1990s, 
agriculture was central to job creation for the growing labor force. The set of policy 
initiatives associated with land reform, trade liberalization, and the promotion of the 
household sector were crucial in providing conditions for robust growth in the agricultural 
sector, and the resultant improvement in the living standards of rural households (World 
Bank, 1998; Benjamin and Brandt, 2004). However, the gains from correcting these 
distortions were not sustainable given the agricultural sector’s inability to absorb the 
growing labor force and sustain the type of poverty reduction witnessed in the early 1990s 
(Van de Walle and Cratty, 2004; World Bank, 2006). The share of agriculture in total 
employment declined from more than two-thirds in 1990 to around 58% in 2004. The 
underemployment rate has also shown a tendency to increase in rural areas with GSO 
(2006) recording an average rate of 25% in recent years.  
 
In contrast, the emergence of a vibrant private sector, which was given impetus by the 
introduction of the Enterprise Law of 2000, created new wage employment opportunities in 
urban areas.
1 During the period 1993-2002, the average real wage rate grew rapidly by an 
average rate of 12% per annum with the strongest growth observed in urban areas, 
especially in the Southeast region (Pham and Reilly, 2007). 
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The foregoing factors resulted in a widening of the urban-rural gap in household living 
standards over time (Nguyen et al., 2007). Although the absolute poverty rate has declined 
substantially since the introduction of the doi moi, poverty continues to be far more 
pervasive in rural than in urban areas. The incidence of household poverty in urban areas 
reduced from 25% in 1993 to well under 10% by 2004. Though the rural headcount poverty 
rate has halved over the same period, it remains stubbornly high and was recorded at 25% 
in 2004.
2 The increasing disparity in urban-rural welfare provides important incentives that 
stimulate the rural-urban migration flows in Vietnam. 
 
According to the 1999 Population and Housing Census data, 6.5% of the population over 
five years of age (about 4.5 million people) changed their place of residence between 1994 
and 1999.
3 It is not surprising that provinces with the highest population density (in the Red 
River Delta) and those with low household incomes in the central regions (the North and 
South Central Coast) had the highest rate of net outward migration. The country’s three 
largest cities, Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chin Minh City (HCMC), were the main 
destinations for migrants. For instance, out of a total of nearly one million inward migrants 
to the Southeast, HCMC received nearly one half of them.
4 
 
An important implication of the increased internal population movement is the significant 
amount of remittances repatriated by migrants. Le and Nguyen (1999), using the Vietnam 
Living Standards Surveys (VLSS) data from 1992/93, report that about one-fifth of 
households received remittances during the 12 months prior to the survey interview date 
and these were equivalent to, on average, about 38% of their household expenditures. 
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Despite the great volume of remittance flows, there has been little empirical work 
investigating remittance-related issues in Vietnam, presumably due to the limited 
availability of data. The data constraint is particularly acute for the analysis of remittance 
behavior among migrants since detailed data on migrants themselves are often absent in 
conventional Vietnamese household surveys (e.g., the VLSS or the VHLSS).  
 
Fortunately for our purposes, data from the 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey have recently 
become available. This survey collected detailed information on migrants within Vietnam. 
The main research aim of this paper is to use these data to examine the key factors that 
influence the remittance behavior of internal migrants in Vietnam. Given the absence of 
data on recipients, our focus will be on the remitters. We specifically examine, among other 
things, how the circumstances of migrants at the destination, their link to relatives left 
behind, and the time spent at the destination influence their remittance behavior. According 
to the 2004 Migration Survey, more than one-half of migrants sent money/goods home to 
their relatives during the 12 months prior to interview. Among those who remit, the total 
value amounted to, on average, about 17% of migrants’ earnings, reflecting the potential 
importance of remittances to the origin households.  
  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a review of 
the existing theoretical literature on remittance motives and frames some of the research 
questions of primary interest to this study. A description of the migration survey data used 
for the empirical analysis is provided in Section 3. Section 4 outlines and justifies the 
variables used in our empirical model and Section 5 discusses some econometric issues 
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related to the estimation of the empirical relationship of interest. Section 6 presents the 
empirical results and Section 7 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
There have been a variety of theoretical models adduced to explain the motives underlying 
remittance behavior, including altruism, exchange or self-interest, and insurance. The 
altruistic behavior is modeled by allowing the utility of a remitter to be derived from the 
well-being or consumption level of those recipients left behind (Becker, 1974). This 
basically implies a negative relationship between the income of the recipient and the 
amount of remittances. Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002), on the other hand, examine the 
effect of multiple migrants (as opposed to a single migrant) on the level of remittances. 
They argue that under pure insurance (or self-interest) motives, the number of other 
migrants in the family should not affect the amount of per-migrant remittances. However, 
under altruism, the presence of other remitting migrants will reduce the average size of 
remittances. Using data for Guyana, Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002) find some support for 
the presence of altruism. 
 
The exchange motive implies a complex relationship between the recipient’s income and 
the size of remittances. Cox (1987) formalizes a model where private transfers represent 
payments for services rendered. Under this model, an increase in the remitter’s income will 
be associated with a higher probability of transfers as well as a larger amount because the 
remitter is willing to pay more for the services provided by the recipient. On the other hand, 
if the recipient’s income rises, the opportunity cost of providing the service will rise, and 
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the recipient is thus likely to require a higher price for the service provided. As a result, an 
increase in the recipient’s income will reduce the probability of transfer. If the transfer does 
take place, then the amount of the transfer could rise, fall, or stay the same depending on 
the remitter’s elasticity of demand for the services of the recipient.  
 
The empirical findings of Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992) and Cox et al. (1998) suggest 
a positive relationship between the size of transfers and the recipient’s pre-transfer income, 
rejecting the altruism behavior of remitters. It is perhaps questionable whether the Cox 
(1987) theoretical framework has as much relevance to the Vietnamese context as it does 
for the case of the United States. However, it is worth noting that Secondi (1997), using 
data for China, also finds that altruism alone cannot explain the observed transfers and that 
exchange may indeed be involved. In the context of China, where much of the financial 
flows appear to be transfers from adult children to their elderly parents, child-care is found 
to be one of the main services that parents render to their adult children in exchange for 
money (Secondi, 1997). 
 
The above motives are certainly not mutually exclusive and an individual migrant may 
have more than one motivation for remitting home at any given point in time. Lucas and 
Stark (1985), for instance, propose “tempered altruism” or “enlightened self-interest” to 
refer to transfers motivated by a combination of altruism and self-interest. This is based on 
the view that remittances are part of a self-enforcing contractual arrangement between a 
migrant and his or her family, which is of mutual benefit. The migrant adheres to the 
arrangement as long as it is in their interest to do so (Lucas and Stark, 1985). For example, 
using data drawn from the National Migration Study of Botswana, their analysis suggests 
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that transfers are made as a repayment for the cost of the migrant’s education and 
transportation.  
 
In a similar context to the contractual arrangement, Stark (1991) suggests a model 
incorporating risk-sharing motives. In this model, remittances allow risk-averse households 
to diversify their income sources and thus minimize the adverse effects of income shocks 
(Stark, 1991; Gubert, 2002). Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) also argue that migrants 
are likely to behave as risk-averse economic agents and purchase insurance in the face of 
economic uncertainty. In this way, remittances can be considered as a payment to insure 
against risky income outcomes in the destination region or country. Based on data for 
Mexican migrants in the United States, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) find that 
income risk proxies (e.g., being an undocumented immigrant or not having social networks 
within the United States) are associated with a higher propensity to remit and with a higher 
level of remittances.  
 
Quinn (2005), on the other hand, suggests another model of remittance behavior whereby 
remittances are treated as both a consumption transfer to households and as an alternative 
saving mechanism for migrants. The model predicts that the migrant’s remittance/saving 
behavior is affected by the relative rate of return on their savings and on the savings of the 
remittance-receiving household. Using data on Mexican workers in the United States, the 
author finds that migrants remit more and save less when the remittance-receiving 
household’s rate of return on savings increases (or the migrant’s return falls). His findings 
imply that an improved access to savings and investment mechanisms for recipient 
households in the home country may increase remittance inflows from migrants.  
  8 
It is useful to now review the relevance of the existing theories to the current Vietnamese 
context. As noted in the previous section, one of the main factors for the increased internal 
migration in recent years is the growing urban-rural gap in living standards. One of the 
research questions of interest in this paper is to see whether the migrant’s remittance 
behavior is driven by altruism (i.e., to support his/her family members left behind, 
presumably, in a poorer area with limited economic opportunities). Unfortunately, our data 
do not allow for the inclusion of the income/consumption level of the recipient household 
in the estimated remittance equation, which is often used to examine the altruistic motive in 
the literature. Instead, we use the information on the presence of the migrant’s immediate 
family members at the destination to indirectly inform this issue.  
 
The data do not permit an explicit examination of the exchange motive proposed by Cox 
(1987). However, it is intended to shed some light on the relevance of the self-enforcing 
contractual arrangement theory, as popularized by Lucas and Stark (1985), to the case of 
Vietnam. This will be undertaken through an empirical interrogation of the relationship 
between the education level of migrants and their remittance behavior. 
 
Another theory, and one perhaps most relevant to the case of Vietnam, relates to the Stark 
(1991) model of risk-sharing motives. Internal migrants within Vietnam generally face less 
risk/uncertainty at the destination than international migrants, such as Mexican migrants in 
the United States (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Nevertheless, given the existence of 
the complex household registration system as described in more detail below, internal 
migrants in Vietnam have to cope with various problems including their access to basic 
public services, which is curtailed in the absence of appropriate registration. It would be 
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interesting, therefore, to investigate whether migrants send money home as an insurance 




The empirical analysis reported in this paper is based on data from the 2004 Vietnam 
Migration Survey. The survey was undertaken by the General Statistical Office (GSO) of 
Vietnam with the aim to provide detailed information on internal migration in the post doi 
moi era (GSO, 2005). It was conducted in areas identified with high immigration rates 
based on the 1999 Population and Housing Census, and the sample was selected using the 
sampling frame of the Population Census (see GSO, 2005). They included some 
enumeration areas of Hanoi, the Northeast Economic Zone (Hai Phong, Hai Duong and 
Quang Ning), the Central Highlands (Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong), Ho Chi 
Minh City, and the Southeast Industrial Zone (Bing Duong and Dong Nai).  
 
The survey interviewed both migrants and non-migrants in the destination areas, who were 
in the 15 to 59 age-group category. In this survey we restrict our analysis to migrants, and 
these are defined as those who had moved from one district to another in the five years 
prior to interview but not more recently than a month before the interview date. The survey 
covered a wide range of topics including information on the migration process, socio-
economic characteristics of migrants, demographic composition of household members (at 
the destination), housing conditions, access to public services, and personal history (e.g., 
migration and employment activity) of migrants. 
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The survey data are not without some limitations. For example, the survey does not contain 
any information on the household from which the migrant originated. This implies that we 
have no information on the potential recipients of migrant remittances or for what purpose 
the remittances were used. It is also unfortunate that non-migrants are those found in the 
destination areas only and this essentially prevents any analysis of the process governing 
the migration decision. Nevertheless, the data do contain detailed information on migrants 
themselves, and this allows for an investigation of the effects of various factors on migrant 
remittance behavior.  
 
4.  The Empirical Variables 
 
The empirical model specified in this study is eclectic in nature and guided by some of the 
theoretical considerations outlined in an earlier section, but also reflects strongly the 
Vietnamese context within which the analysis is situated. Table 1 reports the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables used in our analysis, and contains selected summary 
statistics. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The key dependent variable is expressed in millions of dong and is defined as the total 
value of money/goods a migrant sent back home to relatives in the 12 month period prior to 
the survey interview date.
5 Among those who remit, the average amount of remittances is 
about two million dong. However, for a large number of individuals in the sample the 
variable is censored at zero requiring use of a specific econometric approach for the 
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empirical analysis, which is discussed in the next section. A variety of explanatory 
variables are used and these are now described in turn in the following sub-sections.
6 
 
Characteristics of Individual Migrants 
 
A set of individual characteristics capturing the migrant’s age, gender and marital status, 
whether the migrant is the head of the household, and whether the migrant belongs to the 
Kinh ethnic group, which is the majority ethnic group in Vietnam, are included in the 
regression analysis. Variables capturing the education level of migrants are also included to 
inform the theory of contractual arrangement (Lucas and Stark, 1985). We would expect a 
positive relationship between the amount of remittances and the education level as the 
migrant’s education can be considered as reflecting an earlier household investment 




Variables relating to the structure of the migrant’s household at the destination are also 
included in the analysis. These variables include measures that indicate whether the spouse, 
school-age children (those aged five to 18 years) or parent(s) are present at the destination, 
as well as a variable for the total number of household members. The presence of 
immediate family members at the destination would imply potentially weaker ties to the 
place of origin and, if altruistic behavior is present, negative effects for these variables are 
anticipated (see Markova and Reilly, 2007). In addition, variables representing the housing 
tenure status of a migrant (e.g., whether the migrant owns the accommodation and/or 
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whether it is of a permanent type) are also included. The expected signs for the estimated 
effects of these variables are again assumed negative. If the migrant owns the housing 
and/or lives in a permanent-built dwelling, it may imply that the migrant has a less transient 
connection with the destination or that the migrant’s living condition at the destination is 
relatively more secure. In either case, the migrant is likely to remit less.  
 
Employment Status of Migrants 
 
We also include a set of variables that capture the labor market earnings of the migrant as 
well as controls for whether the migrant receives any bonus or housing benefits relating to 
the job held. We would expect a positive coefficient on both the level of earnings and the 
dummy variable for receiving a bonus. However, receiving some housing benefits is likely 
to reduce the insecurity of the migrant at the destination and thus a lower level of 
remittances may be needed for insurance purposes. A mutually exclusive set of variables 
designed to capture the type of enterprise in which the migrant works (e.g., government,
7 
domestic private sector, foreign invested sector and others) are also included and are taken 
to reflect the security of the migrant’s job in the destination labor market. For instance, if 
the migrant works for a government organization, their job is likely to be relatively stable in 
nature and, as a result, the migrant may be less likely, ceteris paribus, to remit money home 
for insurance purposes. 
 
The Migrant’s Registration Status 
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This study also investigates the influence of the Vietnamese migrant registration system on 
remittance behavior. Vietnam has a complex household registration system delineated 
across four levels of registration: KT1 (the migrant is registered in the district where the 
person resides); KT2 (the migrant is not registered in the district where the person resides, 
but registered at another district or in the same province); KT3 (the migrant has temporary 
registration for a period of six months or more); KT4 (the migrant has temporary 
registration for a period of less than six months). 
 
These four categories can be broadly allocated into two groups – permanent registration 
(KT1 and KT2) and temporary status (KT3 and KT4) at the destination. Given that the 
migrant’s registration status potentially captures whether the move is temporary or 
permanent, we would expect a positive relationship between the migrant’s temporary status 
and the level of remittances compared to a more permanent registration status. However, if 
the motive for remittances is altruistic, whether the migrant’s move is permanent or 
temporary should not affect the size of transfer remitted. On the other hand, not having a 
permanent registration status could also be taken to reflect the vulnerability of the migrant’s 
position at the destination. According to Deshingkar et al. (2006), for instance, migrants 
with KT3 or KT4 status have to secure the most basic services at prices well above average, 
and some public services may be inaccessible to them. Hence, if we observe a positive 
coefficient on the variables for KT3 or KT4 (with KT1 providing the base category in 
estimation), this could be interpreted as evidence supportive of an insurance motive for 
remittances. It is also worth noting that a relatively small number of migrants (4%) report 
having no registration at all.  
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Duration of Stay at the Destination  
 
In order to examine the relevance of the remittance decay hypothesis (RDH) for Vietnam 
(see Liu and Reilly, 2004), we also include the time spent at the destination. Unfortunately, 
in the survey migrants are defined as those who had moved from one district to another in 
the five year period prior to the interview date. We are thus unable to fully explore the issue 
of RDH for the case of Vietnam. Nonetheless, the duration variables should proxy some 
general tendencies in this regard. The duration variables are splined using the number of 
months spent at the destination (see table 1 for the nodes used).  
 
Ease of Migration Process 
 
In order to examine how the security/stability of the migrant’s position at the destination 
affects remittance behavior, a number of other potentially informative variables are also 
included. One is a dummy variable for whether the migrant faced any difficulty on arrival 
in the host destination.
8 If the insurance theory of remittances is valid, a positive sign for 
the coefficient corresponding to this variable is likely as it captures the vulnerability of the 
migrant. We also include a variable designed to  capture whether the migrant had any 
relatives in the destination location on arrival to determine whether or not network effects 
are important. We also include a similar variable for the presence of friends and/or other 
individuals from their location of origin. Finally, a dummy variable representing whether 
the migrant has any health insurance at the destination is also included, as this could be 
taken to capture the migrant’s degree of integration at the destination. The coefficients on 
the network and insurance variables are anticipated to be negative since, if the migrant has 
  15 
a social network and/or any insurance at the destination, reliance on relatives for any 




There are also a number of other variables contained in our empirical specification. These 
include the number of visits to relatives that migrants undertook within the 12 month period 
prior to the interview. The sign of this coefficient is anticipated to be positive as the greater 
number of visits captures a closer relationship with the relatives left behind and provides a 
greater opportunity to directly remit money and/or goods. The survey also asked questions 
on migrants’ loans, and we thus include variables capturing the migrant’s borrowing 
behavior. More specifically, we include a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables 
defined as (1) if the migrant has no loans, (2) if the migrant secured loans from relatives, 
(3) if the migrant secured loans from a financial institution, and (4) if the migrant secured 
loans from others. The first provides the base category in estimation. These variables are 
designed to capture, among other things, whether there is any financial mechanism or 
capital market operating within the family, and the estimated coefficients will reflect how 
these variables affect the amount of remittances.  
 
We also include a set of variables that indicate the geographical characteristics of the origin 
and destination places. The set includes a dummy variable for whether the destination is a 
large city and for whether or not the migrant comes from a rural area. We are likely to 
observe a positive relationship between the former of these variables and the level of 
remittances as such locations are more likely to be characterized by better financial 
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infrastructures (e.g., banks and post-offices) that facilitate the transfer of goods and money, 
and better transportation links to the area of origin. In addition, provincial dummies (based 
on the destination) and seasonal dummies (based on the month of the interview) are also 
included. The former are designed to capture spatial differences that may be important to 
remittance behavior, and the latter are included to capture potential seasonal effects in this 
type of activity.  
 
5. Econometric  Methodology 
 
One of the key issues affecting the estimation of a migrant remittance function is the 
censored nature of the dependent variable. This occurs because not all migrants remit 
money in a given year. The application of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will generate 
biased estimates in such a context, with the magnitude of the bias linked to the proportion 
of non-censored observations in the sample. Conventional linear regression methods are 
therefore inappropriate for the censored dependent variable as they fail to account for the 
qualitative difference between censored (zero) observations and uncensored (continuous) 
observations. When data are censored, an approach that incorporates a discrete element (to 
generate the zero observations) and a continuous element (to generate the positive 
observations) is required (Greene, 2003). The most commonly used censored regression 
model in this context is the tobit model (Tobin, 1958).  
 
This method has been used in various studies in the migrant remittance literature including 
those by Ahlburg and Brown (1998), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Brown (1997), 
Liu and Reilly (2004), and Markova and Reilly (2007). The tobit model offers a simple way 
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of estimating the determinants of remittances and is employed for the empirical analysis 
reported in this paper.   
 
The underlying structure of the remittance equation is defined as follows: 
 
(1)    if 0 R  
*
i i R R =
*
i >
0 Ri =    otherwise 
 
where Ri is the amount of money that the i
th individual remits, which is observed if R
*
i is 
positive. The latter is an unobservable latent dependent variable that captures the i
th 
individual’s propensity to remit. It is defined as follows: 
 
(2)        where  i i
*
i u R + = β X ( )
2
i , 0 N ~ u σ  
 
where Xi is a 1×k vector of independent variables where k is the number of variables 
including a constant term, β is a k×1 vector of unknown parameters, and ui is an 
independently and normally distributed error term with mean zero and constant variance σ
2. 
This model is regarded as a censored regression model because observations of R
*
i at or 
below zero are censored. In other words, Ri is either positive (Ri > 0) or zero (Ri = 0). 
Based on this information, the likelihood function can be expressed as: 
 
(3)   ( ) ( ) ∏ ∏
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where Φ(⋅) and φ(⋅) denote the operators for the cumulative distribution and probability 
density functions of the standard normal respectively. The first part resembles the 
likelihood function for a probit model for the event of zero, while the second part is similar 
to the likelihood function for the conventional OLS model on the sample observations that 
are continuous (i.e., not censored). It is convenient to log this likelihood function to 
facilitate estimation and the inverse of the regression model’s information matrix provides 
the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for the parameter estimates.
9  
 
6. Empirical  Results 
 
We restrict our sample to working migrants, as the number not working is negligible, and 
only include those who report labor market earnings.
10 This yields a total sample size of 
4,388 migrants. More than half (55%) are reported to have sent some money/goods to their 
relatives within the 12 month period prior to the interview date. Among those who remit, 
the average share of remittances in migrant earnings is about 17%. This is comparable to 
the findings for urban migrants reported in a recent study for China (see Knight et al., 
1999). Table 2 reports the tobit estimates for the remittance model, translated into marginal 
and impact effects for the continuous and dummy variables respectively.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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In general, the individual-level characteristics of migrants such as their age, gender and 
ethnicity do not appear to affect remittance behavior. In contrast, the education level of 
migrants has a well defined positive effect on remittances. For instance, if the migrant has 
primary education, the amount of remittances sent home increases by one million dong 
compared to a migrant who is illiterate, on average and ceteris paribus. The marginal effect 
rises to 1.4 million dong for those with a college education or better. Given that we are 
controlling for labor market earnings, the positive coefficients on the education variables 
appear consistent with the theory suggested by Lucas and Stark (1985), which suggests that 
remittances can be considered as a repayment for the resources that the migrant’s family 
originally invested in the migrant’s education.  
 
The presence of a migrant’s immediate family members at the destination is estimated to 
reduce remittances. Markova and Reilly (2007) provide comparable evidence for a sample 
of Bulgarian migrants in Spain. The effect for Vietnamese migrants is particularly 
pronounced for those with school-age children and parents present. The amount of their 
remittances is lower compared to those without such dependents by 0.2 and 0.6 million 
dong respectively, on average and ceteris paribus. The closer the ties that the migrant has 
with those left behind, captured by the number of his or her return visits to the location of 
origin, the greater the level of remittances sent home.
11 These findings seem to render some 
support for an altruistic motive with respect to remittance behavior but are also potentially 
consistent with migrants retaining links to ensure favorable treatment in the context of 
family inheritance. 
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The labor market earnings of migrants exert an expected positive effect on remittances. 
According to the marginal effect, if monthly earnings increase by one million dong, this 
raises annual remittances by 0.6 million dong. The remittance-earnings elasticity, computed 
at the overall sample means, is estimated to be 0.53, which is on the low side compared to 
the existing literature.
12 However, a direct comparison with the literature is fraught with 
difficulty given differences in both empirical specifications used and geographical contexts. 
Nevertheless, this finding suggests that the flow of remittances in Vietnam is fairly 
insensitive to labor market conditions, as captured by earnings, in the destination location. 
Bonus payments on the job also impact positively on remittances, with those in receipt of 
such a job-related benefit remitting 0.15 million more dong, on average, than those who do 
not.  
 
As for the sector of the enterprise where migrants work, compared with working in a 
private domestically-owned enterprise, which could be situated within the informal sector, 
a migrant who works for the government is likely to repatriate less money home. The 
opposite is the case for those working in the foreign-invested sector. This may reflect the 
stability of jobs in a particular sector which possibly influences the degree of a migrant’s 
reliance on their family in the originating household, and thus reduces the co-insurance 
motive for remitting. For instance, jobs in the government sector are likely to be more 
stable and more permanent, and migrants working in this sector thus rely less on their 
family at home to insure against labor market risk. Moreover, the positive coefficient on the 
foreign-sector dummy seems to indicate that the benefits of FDI may not be restricted to 
urban workers, with trickle-down effects to rural areas through the process of remittances 
evident in these estimates.  
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In regard to registration, a migrant possessing the most temporary form of registration 
status (K4), on average and ceteris paribus, sends a greater volume of remittances home 
than a comparable migrant with permanent residential status (K1). Hence the fragile nature 
of the migrant’s residential status appears to matter in Vietnam and is resonant of the 
finding reported by Liu and Reilly (2004) for rural migrants in Jinan (China). The 
temporary and uncertain nature of the status encourages migrants to retain strong links with 
the origin household to insure against the risk of expulsion. Similarly, if migrants own their 
housing, or if they live in permanent accommodation, they are found to remit less. This 
again supports the view that if the nature of the migration is permanent and/or stable, 
migrants tend to send less money home, providing some support for the co-insurance 
theory.  
 
We find a positive relationship between the number of months at the destination and the 
level of remittances. This is particularly the case for the initial year. However, after the 
third year the relationship becomes negative and consistent with the remittance decay 
hypothesis. This seems to suggest that over time migrants acquire a greater level of location 
specific human capital in the destination thus reducing the risk of failure and, assuming a 
co-insurance motive underlying remittances, require less support from home. This 
manifests itself in a tendency to reduce the amount of money and goods remitted home by 
the migrant. 
 
As far as network effects are concerned, having relatives at the destination on arrival exerts 
a positive effect on the level of remittances suggesting that such networks assist migrants to 
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settle in more smoothly at the new location thus reducing settlement costs. We found no 
significant effect for the network based around non-relatives. In contrast, if the migrant 
encountered any difficulty on arrival, less money is sent back. However, whether the 
migrant possesses a health insurance card does not seem to exert a significant impact on 
remittance behavior.  
 
Having a loan from relatives negatively impacts on the level of remittances. We could 
interpret the negative sign as reflecting the fact that relatives may be more relaxed about the 
time profile for loan repayment. In contrast, it is revealing that those who obtained loans 
from financial institutions, presumably in their location of origin, do remit more than those 
without loans. This may reflect the fact that they are required to service such loans in a 
more timely fashion and within a shorter time frame than that tolerated by relatives.   
 
Finally, compared to those migrants located in Hanoi, those residing in Quang Ninth (in the 
Northeast Economic Zone) and Ho Chi Minh City remit a larger amount of transfers. This 
could be taken to suggest that migrants are selectively choosing destinations with a view to 
servicing the requirements of their origin household. The greater the requirements, the more 
likely migrants are to re-locate to the more buoyant labor markets in Vietnam. Finally, 
migrants who reside in a large urban city remit relatively more than those who do not, and 
this may simply reflect the fact that the large cities possess the financial and other 
infrastructures that more easily allow and facilitate the transfer of money and goods.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
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This paper has empirically examined the key determinants of migrant remittances at the 
individual level using a recently conducted survey on internal migration within Vietnam. 
Our empirical model incorporated, in an eclectic manner, variables assumed to capture 
some of the underlying motives for remitting suggested by existing theories. The paper also 
tried to uncover some factors unique to Vietnam that determine remittance behavior in that 
country. 
 
The empirical analysis yielded a number of key findings and suggests that no one theory is 
likely to be sufficient to explain the remittance phenomenon in Vietnam. The study found 
that the education of migrants has a well-defined positive effect on the level of remittances. 
This seems to provide some support for the theory of contractual arrangement (Lucas and 
Stark, 1985), where remittances are seen as a repayment for the money and resources that 
the migrant’s family originally invested in the migrant’s education. The negative coefficient 
on the variable for the presence of the migrant’s parents at the destination also provides 
some support for this notion. However, the negative coefficient can also be seen as 
supportive of altruistic motives (Becker, 1974). Unfortunately, given the absence of any 
information regarding the recipient household, such as the origin household’s income or 
assets, we are unable to interrogate empirically this issue in a more systematic fashion. On 
the other hand, the observed negative coefficient relating to the presence of school age 
children at the destination suggests that remittances can also be seen as an investment in the 
education of the migrant’s family.  
 
The empirical estimates also provide support for the co-insurance theory (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Stark, 1991). For instance, we have found that having a family 
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network at the destination increases the level of remittances. Moreover, the sector of the 
enterprise where the migrant works, which we take to reflect the security or otherwise of 
the migrant’s job, also impacts migrant remittance behavior. Given that these variables 
capture the vulnerability of the migrant’s position at the destination and/or the ease of the 
process of settling into a new location, our findings appear consistent with the insurance 
motive where the migrant sends remittances as a payment to insure against labor market 
uncertainty at the destination. 
 
Another key finding of this paper is that temporary migrants tend to remit more as revealed 
by the significant positive effect corresponding to the variable for temporary registration 
status (K4). This can be interpreted as evidence for the co-insurance motive as this 
registration status indicates the relatively insecure position of migrants in the destination 
area. On the other hand, the coefficients for the time spent at the destination provide 
support for the remittance decay hypothesis. A significant positive relationship between the 
number of months and the level of remittances is found for the initial year, but the 
estimated relationship becomes negative by the third year. 
 
The negative coefficients on the variables for the presence of the migrant’s immediate 
family members at the destination provide evidence for the altruistic behavior of migrants. 
However, given data constraints, we could not examine the validity of the altruism 
hypothesis in a direct way. On the other hand, our findings reveal that altruism is unlikely 
to provide a sufficient explanation for the motivation to remit.
13  On balance, our 
econometric findings are not inconsistent with migrants acting as risk-averse economic 
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agents sending remittances as part of an insurance strategy in the face of economic 
uncertainty.  
 
We believe our analysis sheds some important light on the role remittances perform in 
terms of risk-coping and mutual support within the family. However, the fact that we are 
unable to control explicitly for origin household characteristics in our analysis suggests the 
need for some interpretational caution. It may be the case that the introduction of controls 
capturing the socio-economic status of families at the place of origin, if they were available 
to us, could weaken some of the estimated relationships uncovered. In addition, it should be 
borne in mind that if such omitted variables were highly correlated with key variables 
included in the estimated regression model, this may introduce bias in some of the 
estimated effects reported. Unfortunately, neither of these are issues for which the current 
data allow further investigation. Nevertheless, we do believe that the empirical evidence 
presented emphasizes the need for policy-makers, when formulating migration-related 
policies, to be aware of the fact that many migrants retain strong economic links to those 
left behind. A more thorough investigation of how migrant remittances are actually used in 
the origin household is required before definitive conclusions can be offered on the effect 
such remittances exert on vulnerability and poverty within the origin households in 
Vietnam. This analysis should clearly comprise part of an important agenda for future 
research for Vietnam. 
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
  Description Mean 
    
Remittances (million dong)  Total value of money/goods a migrant sent back to relatives in 
the 12 month period prior to the survey interview date. 
1.078 
Age  Age expressed in years  28.659 
Household head  Dummy variable for being household head  0.541 
Kinh (majority ethnic group 
in Vietnam) 
Dummy variable for being Kinh  0.900 
Female  Dummy variable for being female  0.557 
Married  Dummy variable for being married  0.574 
Presence of spouse  Dummy variable for spouse living with migrant  0.412 
Presence of school age 
children 
Dummy variable for school age (5-18) children living with 
migrant 
0.244 
Presence of parents  Dummy variable for parent(s) living with migrant  0.136 
Household size  Total number of household members living with migrant (at the 
destination) 
3.546 
Education:    
Illiterate  Dummy variable for being illiterate  0.029 
     Primary  Dummy variable for having primary education  0.104 
     Lower secondary  Dummy variable for having lower secondary education  0.487 
     Upper secondary  Dummy variable for having upper secondary education  0.309 
     College+  Dummy variable for having a college degree or higher  0.072 
Earnings (million dong)  Monthly labor market earnings  0.908 
Receive bonus  Dummy variable for receiving any bonus at work  0.351 
Receive housing benefits  Dummy variable for receiving any housing benefits at work  0.011 
    
Sector of Organization:    
   Government  Dummy variable for working for government organization  0.131 
   Private  Dummy variable for working for private organization  0.653 
   Foreign invested  Dummy variable for working for foreign invested organization  0.208 
   Others  Dummy variable for working for other type of organization  0.008 
    
Reside in a large city  Dummy variable for living in a large city  0.386 
Coming from the countryside  Dummy variable for originating from a rural area  0.785 
Live in own house  Dummy variable for living in a house that migrant owns  0.317 
Live in permanent dwelling  Dummy variable for living in a dwelling of a permanent type  0.159 
    
Registration status:    
   Not registered  Dummy variable for not being registered at the destination  0.041 
   K1 (permanent)  Dummy variable for having K1 registration status  0.116 
   K2 (permanent)  Dummy variable for having K2 registration status  0.063 
   K3 (temporary)  Dummy variable for having K3 registration status  0.316 
   K4 (temporary)  Dummy variable for having K4 registration status  0.464 
    
Duration in destination    
   12 months or less  Spine for 1-12 months  10.785 
   13-24 months  Spine for 13-24 months  7.395 
   25-48 months  Spine for 25-48 months  8.314 
    
Had relatives at destination 
on arrival 
Dummy variable for having had some relatives at the destination 
at arrival 
0.599 
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  Description Mean 
Had friends at destination on 
arrival 
Dummy variable for having had some friends/countrymen at the 
destination at arrival 
0.330 
    
Faced difficulty at arrival  Dummy variable for having faced some difficulty at arrival  0.461 
    
Have a health insurance card  Dummy variable for having an insurance card  0.369 
    
Loans:    
      No loans   Dummy variable for having no loans  0.776 
     Loans from relatives  Dummy variable for having loans from relatives  0.084 
     Loans from financial inst.  Dummy variable for having loans from financial institution  0.040 
     Loans from others  Dummy variable for having loans from others  0.100 
    
No. of visits to relatives  Number of visits paid to relatives during the last 12 months 
prior to the interview 
2.548 
    
Province (current place of 
residence): 
  
     Hanoi  Dummy variable for living in Hanoi  0.193 
     Hai Phong (Than phi)  Dummy variable for living in Hai Phong (Than phi)  0.044 
     Hai Phong (Tin)  Dummy variable for living in Hai Phong  0.052 
     Quang Ninth  Dummy variable for living in Quang Ninth  0.095 
     Gia Lai  Dummy variable for living in Gia Lai  0.053 
     Dace Lac  Dummy variable for living in Dace Lac  0.054 
     Dak Nong  Dummy variable for living in Dak Nong  0.054 
     Lam Dong  Dummy variable for living in Lam Dong  0.050 
     Ho Chi Minh  Dummy variable for living in Ho Chi Minh City  0.199 
     Bing Duong  Dummy variable for living in Bing Duong  0.098 
     Dong Nai  Dummy variable for living in Dong Nai  0.108 
    
Month of interview    
    Jan, Feb, March, April  Dummy variable for being interviewed between January and 
April 2004 
0.009 
     September  Dummy variable for being interviewed in September 2004  0.165 
     October  Dummy variable for being interviewed in October 2004  0.498 
     November  Dummy variable for being interviewed in November 2004  0.229 
     December  Dummy variable for being interviewed in December 2004  0.100 
Source: The 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey. 
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Tobit Model  




    
Age  0.025 [0.018] 
Age squared  -3.16E-04 [2.61E-4] 
    
Household head  0.079* [0.047] 
Female  0.055 [0.046] 






    
Married  0.065 [0.065] 
Presence of spouse  -0.001 [0.062] 
Presence of school age children  -0.167** [0.067] 
Presence of parents  -0.556*** [0.076] 
Household size  0.021* [0.012] 
    
Education:     
  Illiterate  †   
  Primary  1.002*** [0.244] 
  Lower secondary  1.033*** [0.239] 
  Upper secondary  1.040*** [0.241] 
  College+  1.248*** [0.257] 
    
Earnings  0.624*** [0.043] 
Received bonus  0.146*** [0.054] 
Received housing benefits  0.097 [0.188] 
    
Sector of Organization:     
   Government  -0.221*** [0.076] 
    Private   †   
   Foreign invested  0.194*** [0.068] 
   Others  0.113 [0.215] 
    
Reside in a large city  0.210* [0.114] 
Coming from rural area  0.123** [0.052] 
Live in self-owned housing  -0.157** [0.071] 
Live in a dwelling of permanent type  -0.113* [0.063] 
    
Registration Status:    
   Not registered  0.260** [0.132] 
   K1 (permanent)   †   
   K2 (permanent)  -0.059 [0.127] 
   K3 (temporary)  0.224*** [0.084] 
   K4 (temporary)  0.580*** [0.098] 
    
Splines for duration in destination:     
   12 months or less  0.058*** [0.009] 
   13-24 months  0.010** [0.005] 
   25-48 months  -0.005* [0.003] 
    
Had relatives at destination on arrival  0.209*** [0.043] 
Had friends at destination on arrival  0.005 [0.044] 
Faced difficulty at arrival  -0.115** [0.045] 
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Have a health insurance card  0.043 [0.060] 
    
Loans:     
     No loans   †  
     Loans with relatives  -0.143* [0.078] 
     Loans with financial institution  0.286** [0.116] 
     Loans with others  0.031 [0.082] 
    
No. of visits home to relatives   0.096*** [0.006] 
    
Province (current place of residence):    
     Hanoi   †  
     Hai Phong (Than phi)  -0.237** [0.116] 
     Hai Phong (Tin)  0.167 [0.150] 
     Quang Ninth  0.751*** [0.127] 
     Gia Lai  -0.279 [0.178] 
     Dace Lac  -0.038 [0.181] 
     Dak Nong  0.011 [0.165] 
     Lam Dong  0.160 [0.157] 
     Ho Chi Minh  0.206** [0.097] 
     Bing Duong  0.089 [0.130] 
     Dong Nai  -0.074 [0.129] 
    
    
No. of observations  4,388 
No. of censored observations  1,987 
σ  2.387 [0.036] 
Pseudo Adjsuted-R
2  0.311 
Log likelihood Value  -6549.12 
Source: Calculations based on the 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey data. 
Notes: 
(a)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
(b) The exogeneity of earnings was investigated using the test of Smith and Blundell (1986) and upheld by the 
data. 
(c) † denotes category omitted in estimation. 
(d) Dummies capturing the months when the interview occurred were also included in the regression model. 
(e) The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the independent variables for the unconditional 
expected values of the dependent variable. For the binary variables, we report the discrete change from 0 to 1. 





















1 It is estimated that there were about 20,000 new establishments formed per annum after 
the introduction of the Enterprise Law in 2000 (see World Bank, 2005). 
 
2 These are based on the authors’ calculations using the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
(VLSS) 1992/93 and the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2004. 
 
3 This does not include short-term, unregistered movement or movement in the six months 
preceding the census date. 
 
4 See endnote 1. 
 
5 It should be noted that in this paper we define a remitter as a migrant who sent any 
money/goods home to their relatives and/or gave any money/goods to the relatives during 
their visits. The data do not allow us to make a distinction between the two types of activity. 
Hence the value of remittances is the total value of the money/goods that the migrant 
sent/gave to his or her relatives during the 12 months prior to the interview. 
 
6 We investigated the magnitude of the correlations between the explanatory variables as a 
prelude to our regression analysis. In general, the correlations were modest in nature with 
the average correlation coefficient about 0.09 in magnitude. The overwhelming majority of 
estimated correlation coefficients were found to be less than 0.3. Thus, we do not believe 
that multicollinearity represents a serious issue for the econometric analysis undertaken 
here. In addition, the role of this particular phenomenon is likely to be attenuated by the 
large sample size used in estimation.    
 
7 Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to distinguish whether the migrant works for the 
government or in a manufacturing state-owned enterprise. 
 
8 Among those migrants who faced some difficulties, the main ones are reported in rank 
order to be housing problems, having no income source, and, related to this, not being able 
to find a job. 
 
9 The estimation of the migrant remittance function using cross-sectional data, as in this 
study, may be affected by the presence of heteroscedasticity. In the context of the tobit 
model this has implications for both parameter consistency and efficiency. As the estimated 
tobit model is not the subject of a rigorous diagnostic testing in this respect, a degree of 
caution is perhaps required. Unfortunately, sandwich estimators for the variance-covariance 
matrix, conventionally used for limited dependent variable models to correct for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and other model assumption violations, are not feasible for 
the censored tobit model.     
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10   We have also excluded from our analysis a small number of observations with 
implausibly large remittance and labor market earnings values. 
 
11 We do not have sufficient information to control explicitly for the distance of the origin 
from the destination location. This may influence the number of trips and visits a migrant 
makes home in any 12 month period.    
 
12 See Liu and Reilly (2004) for a survey of estimates. 
 
13 It should be stressed that this is somewhat speculative given that we have not formally 
tested the predictions of altruism theory in this study.   